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Sino-U.S. and Sino-E.U. Textile Safeguard Agreements: 





The effects of Sino-US and Sino-EU safeguard agreements on US, China and world 
cotton and textile sectors are investigated using a partial equilibrium model. The effects 
are compared to a free trade scenario under the provisions of the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC).  The two agreements capping Chinese textile exports would 
decrease China’s textile and apparel exports, production and domestic consumption by an 
average 1.57 percent, 0.63 percent and, 0.32 percent respectively.  The safeguard 
agreements cause an increase in the U.S. cotton textile price index and a slight decrease 
in U.S. net textile imports and textile consumption.  The agreements cause a decrease in 
the world cotton price and the quantity of cotton traded, but these trends reverse at 
safeguard expiration.  The results generally support the view that the safeguard 
agreements forestall the effects of free trade in textiles and apparel rather than creating 
long lasting shifts in the textile trade.          - 1 -   
Sino-U.S. and Sino-E.U. Textile Safeguard Agreements: 
Comparing the Effects to Free Market Conditions 
 
 
In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the territory of 
any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such condition as to 
cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or 
directly competitive products, the WTO Member so affected may request 
consultations with China with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, 
including whether the affected WTO Member should pursue application of a 
measure under the Agreement on Safeguards. 
 
If, in the course of these bilateral consultations, it is agreed that imports of 
Chinese origin are such a cause and that action is necessary, China shall take such 
action as to prevent or remedy the market disruption.   




The growth of China’s textile industry has been one of the dominant factors 
shaping world cotton and textile markets in recent years.  Since China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, China’s clothing exports have 
grown by almost 70 percent and China’s cotton consumption has grown by 36 percent 
(see Figure 1).  From 2001 to 2004, China’s share of world clothing exports increased 
from 18 percent to over 24 percent (UN Comtrade, 2006).   
With the expiration of global quotas on textiles and apparel (T&A), China’s 
dominance in this industry has increased
1.  In the first quarter of 2005, US imports of 
apparel from China (measured by units) doubled compared to the same period in 2004 
(OTEXA, 2006).  For specific products in the same time period, cotton knit shirts and 
blouses, cotton trousers, and underwear categories increased by approximately 1,250 
                                                 
1  On January 1, 2005, The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) phased out all quotas on imports of 
textiles and apparel from countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).   
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percent, 1,500 percent and 300 percent respectively relative to the first quarter of 2004 
(ICTSD Bridges Weekly, 2005).  Table 1 presents the share of US textile imports 
accounted for by major suppliers from around the world in several import categories 
related to textiles and apparel.  China has claimed the largest share of total U.S. textile 
and apparel imports since 2003 and presently holds a 25 percent market share, a 44 
percent increase over 2004 (see Figure 2).  Contemporaneously, Chinese textile and 
clothing imports gained in importance in the T&A import market of the European Union 
(E.U.).  China’s share of the EU import market doubled from about 15 percent in 2001 
and 2002 to near 30 percent in 2005 (see Figure 2).       
Concerns have risen within both the U.S. and E.U. over the rapid expansion of 
Chinese textile imports into both markets.  In response to domestic pressure from their 
respective textile and apparel industries, the U.S. and E.U. have claimed “market 
disruption” and have reached an accord with China to limit textile import growth for 
certain categories of products.  In Europe, agreement was reached on growth limits of 8-
12 percent per year on ten categories of Chinese textile and clothing products (Europa, 
2005).  Textile import growth in the U.S. from China in the coming three years will be 
10-15 percent for 2006, 12½-16 percent for 2007, and 15-17 percent for 2008 for the 
same basic class of products covered in the E.U. agreement (Gov.cn, 2005).   
The question remains whether these temporary safeguards will effectively reduce 
or merely delay the steady growth of Chinese textile dominance both in the 2006-08 time 
frame of the agreements and beyond.  The imposition of textile safeguards raises several 
specific questions:  What will the economic impact of these temporary safeguards be on 
world textile and cotton markets?  Will demand for textiles and apparel, shifted to other   - 3 -   
suppliers, last effectively beyond the term of the safeguard agreement?  In essence, the 
question is whether the safeguard agreements are more trade diverting or truly trade 
creating.   
It is also likely that the safeguard agreements may affect the raw cotton market as 
well.  What effect will the safeguard agreement have on U.S. cotton exports, especially 
those to its biggest customer, China?  In the 2004/05 marketing year, 25 percent of U.S. 
cotton exports (3.3 million bales) were bound for China where cotton imports from the 
U.S. account for 50 percent of total raw cotton imports (FAS, 2005 and 2006).   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impacts of the agreed upon U.S.-Sino 
and E.U.-Sino textile safeguards on world cotton trade flows, prices, and market 
equilibria.  This analysis first establishes a baseline in which the full effects of free trade 
under the terms of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) are modeled.  Next, a 
scenario is created which models the imposition of caps on certain Chinese textile exports 
based on the two agreements affecting the textile and cotton markets.  By comparing 
baseline estimates to the safeguard agreement scenario, we can quantify the impact of the 
agreements on terms of trade and trade flows between China, the U.S., the E.U., and 
other trading partners.    
Several studies to date have estimated the effects of global free trade on China’s 
T&A trade under the provisions of the ATC.  However, not all of these studies provide 
insight on likely impacts on China’s textile production, and only a very few address 
cotton (see Table 2 for a summary of research).  Recently, studies by Andriamananjara, 
Dean, and Spinanger (2004), and Nordas (2004) discussed the impact of removing quotas 
on clothing exports to developed countries, both indicating that China’s exports to the   - 4 -   
United States could increase significantly with the removal of quotas.  However, neither 
study addressed total textile trade or how China’s textile production might be affected.  
Francois and Spinanger (2004) focused on a methodology for measuring the level of 
protection faced by China and other exporters under the pre-2005 quota system, but 
didn’t address the implications of removing this protection.  Rivera, Agama, and Dean 
(2003), using a static, global CGE methodology, estimated that China’s clothing exports 
would rise more than 100 percent with the removal of the MFA quotas, but did not 
include the impact on China’s textile production in their analysis. 
Several earlier studies (Hertel, et al 1996; Yang, Martin, and Yanagishima, 1997; 
and Francois and Spinanger, 2001) used largely the same methodology as Rivera, Agama, 
and Dean.  Francois and Spinanger’s estimates ranged from a 6 percent change found 
using the standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data, to 43 percent when an 
exogenous 10 percent cost advantage for production in China was incorporated into their 
analysis.  The remaining studies estimated changes ranging from 6 to 16 percent.  Fang 
and Babcock (2003) examined likely impacts of clothing quota removal on China’s 
cotton sector which are based on an assumption that textile production would increase 20 
to 30 percent.  Of these previous studies, only Fang and Babcock, McDonald et al. (2004), 
and Li, Mohanty, and Pan (2005) examined cotton either from an agricultural perspective 
or with respect to competition with other fibers in China’s textile industry.   
Methodology 
           This paper investigates the effects of the ATC quota phase-out and the textile 
safeguard measures on the textile and cotton markets through a combination CGE model 
and a partial equilibrium model.  A dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE)   - 5 -   
model was used to analyze how the global restructuring of T&A production and 
consumption would be expected to change production by China’s textile industry 
(MacDonald et al., 2004).  An econometric partial equilibrium (PE) model of world’s 
fiber sector (Pan et al., 2004) was then used to examine the impact of changing demand 
by the textile industry on the E.U. textile trade, U.S. and China’s textile and cotton 
consumption, production, and their net trades.  Figure 3 presents the linkage between the 
results of the CGE model and the PE model.   
  The effects of quota removal on Chinese textile and apparel production are 
estimated based on an extension of Frankel and Romer’s (1999) work.  We analyze the 
relationship between T&A trade and national income of 91 countries over 37 years.  
Based on this econometric analysis, we exogenously increase the growth of T&A trade in 
the simulation.  Technically, we exogenously increase the efficiency coefficient in the 
export functions for these regions by 0.3 percent annually (on average, with variation 
across countries)
2.  Assuming that quota phase-out will increase certain developing 
exporting countries’ ability to export, we calculated for each developing exporting 
country the share of their T&A production to GDP.  We assume that this ratio represents 
for each country the efficiency in their exporting ability (a crude approach equivalent to a 
productive index; see MacDonald et al., 2004 for detail).  The effects on Chinese textile 
and apparel production are used to estimate the effects on the world, U.S. and Chinese 
cotton markets.         
To further investigate safeguard agreement trade diversion in Chinese textile 
exports to the E.U. and U.S., we make some adjustments in our PE model. Since we are 
                                                 
2 Technical efficiency is assumed to increase with quota removal.  Without trade restricting quotas, global 
trade in textiles is expected to increase resulting in expanded textile production capacity.  This expanded 
capacity is expected to be composed of new plants utilizing updated, more efficient equipment.      - 6 -   
interested in the effects on the cotton sector, we separate the Chinese textile and apparel 
exports into three sectors: cotton textile and apparel exports to the U.S., cotton textile and 
apparel exports to the E.U., and textile and apparel exports to the rest of the world 
(ROW), which includes man-made fiber (MMF) textile and apparel exports to both the 
E.U. and U.S.  At the same time, U.S. and E.U. textile and apparel imports are separated 
as two sectors: cotton textile and apparel imports from China (which equals Chinese 
cotton apparel exports to the U.S. and E.U.) and textile and apparel imports from the 
ROW (including MMF apparel and textile imports from China). The new equations 
added to the model are provided in the Table 3. The equations, parameter estimates (with 
standard errors in parentheses), and diagnostic statistics of the new equations are also 
reported in Table 3.  In addition to the Durbin-Watson statistics reported, tests were 
conducted to detect higher order correlation.  No significant effects were found.  As 
Table 3 shows, Chinese textile and apparel exports to the rest of the world increase as 
domestic apparel prices decrease and Japanese apparel price increases; U.S. cotton textile 
and apparel imports from the ROW increase as the domestic cotton apparel price 
increases and the CAFTA apparel price index decreases; E.U. cotton textile and apparel 
imports from the ROW increase as the domestic cotton apparel price increases and the 
U.S. apparel price index decreases.  The Chinese apparel price index, E.U. apparel price 
index, U.S. apparel price index, Chinese cotton domestic price, and U.S. farm price are 
endogenously solved. 
 In the next step, we exogenously adjusted Chinese cotton apparel exports based 
on the three-year textile safeguard agreements. Other sectors are automatically adjusted   - 7 -   
based on the effects of relative prices around the world.  These results are compared to a 
quota-free trade environment discussed earlier.  
The model is driven by a set of macroeconomic variables such as real GDP, the 
consumer price index (CPI), exchange rates, and population.  Projections for these 
variables were obtained from the 2005 World and U.S. Agricultural Outlook published by 
the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute.  Projections of other variables such 
as acreage, yield, and prices for competing crops (e.g. wheat, rice, and corn), and crude 
oil prices were collected from the same source.   
Simulation and Results  
The simulation procedure compares a baseline estimate assuming continuation of 
all current trade regulations and policies to an alternative scenario.  In this case, the 
baseline models a free trade environment for textiles created by the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing referenced earlier.  The alternative scenario is the imposition of 
safeguard quotas on certain Chinese apparel imports by the U.S. and E.U. through 2008.  
Tables 4-10 present the effects of the textile safeguard agreements compared to a free 
trade baseline (post ATC) in the textile and cotton markets.   
  As shown in Table 4, the textile safeguard agreements decrease China’s textile 
and apparel exports, production and domestic consumption by an average 1.57 percent, 
0.63 percent and, 0.32 percent respectively.  In each case, the greatest negative effects are 
seen in the second year of the safeguards and then mitigate throughout the course of the 
estimation.  The safeguards are shown to increase T&A imports into the U.S. and E.U. 
from sources other than China, as would be expected.  However, while E.U. imports 
quickly revert to sans safeguard levels, the effects on U.S. imports, though declining,   - 8 -   
linger longer.  Increases are also seen in the Chinese apparel price index, again with the 
greatest impact during the terms of the safeguards and then decreasing effects as they 
expire.    
  The safeguard agreement also results in a higher U.S. cotton textile price index 
(see Table 5).  Increases of 2 to 3 percent are seen during the term of the agreement and 
decline rapidly in 2009/01 as the safeguards expire.  Net textile imports decline slightly 
with the safeguards with a concordant increase in U.S. cotton mill use.  U.S. textile 
consumption is shown to decrease with the safeguards in place, but the effects are 
minimal (less than a 0.06 percent decrease).  In the U.S. man-made fiber market (Table 6), 
the textile price index rises initially but quickly subsides as the agreement expires.  Man-
made fiber textile imports show the most market growth with increases mostly between 3 
and 4 percent that continue even as the safeguards are no longer in place.  Mill use shows 
a slight increase and consumption a slight decrease, but both by marginal amounts.   
In the world cotton market (Table 7), it appears the textile safeguards effectively 
decrease the world trade of cotton and the world cotton price (as measured by the A-
index) during the terms of the agreements.  With expiration, effects quickly reverse.  
World production and cotton mill use are both lower under the safeguard scenario, but 
again only marginally as effects in any given year fail to exceed ½ of 1 percent.   
Table 8 reports the effects of the safeguard agreements on cotton markets in the 
U.S. and China.  As with the A-index and world trade, the effects in the U.S. cotton 
market are a lower farm price, lower production, and lower exports during the term of the 
safeguards.  Again, effects reverse as the safeguard agreement expires.  In China, price 
effects are similar to those in the U.S., but the effects on other sectors of the Chinese   - 9 -   
cotton market appear to be more lasting.  Declines in production, imports, and mill use as 
a result of the safeguards continue throughout the estimation period presented here.  
While none of the declines exceed 1 percent, they extend significantly well past 
safeguard expiration.   
The effects of the safeguards on other major cotton exporters mirror those of the 
U.S. (see Table 9).  Declines are shown for all exporters modeled here until 2009/10 
when the agreements expire and exports again increase.  The impacts on other cotton 
importers are more mixed.  Turkish and Pakistani cotton imports decline under the 
safeguard scenario with the negative effects lasting longer in Turkey than in Pakistan.  
Mexico sees its cotton imports increase with safeguards placed on Chinese competitors at 
an increasing rate up until 2010/11 when they begin to return to levels seen without the 
safeguards in place.   
  Table 10 presents an estimate of welfare effects of the textile safeguard 
agreements.  Gains in the U.S. textile and apparel industry would be an estimated 
$US648 million in the three years spanning the agreement.  U.S. cotton producers and 
consumers suffer economic losses as a result of the safeguards.  U.S. government 
expenditures are shown to decrease less with the safeguards in place (due to increased 
support for U.S. cotton producers with lower commodity prices) resulting in an increase 
in government expenditures of $US139 million.  The safeguards are shown to negatively 
impact Chinese producers of both cotton and textiles as well as domestic consumers.  The 
total economic welfare loss in China during the course of the agreement is approximately 
$US2 billion.   
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   This study investigated the impacts on China, the U.S., E.U., and the rest of 
world’s textile and cotton industries due to the Sino-U.S. and Sino-E.U. textile safeguard 
agreements.  The results show that the effects will be marginal in most markets during the 
three-year time period of safeguards, with effects mitigating quickly as the agreements 
expire and market forces hold sway.  For the majority of markets analyzed here, the 
textile safeguard agreements serve to, at best, delay or postpone changes in market 
conditions that are evolving under conditions of free trade.       
However, exceptions to this trend can be seen in several important areas.  First, 
increases in U.S. textile and apparel imports from the rest of the world, China excluded, 
appear to be relatively long lasting.  Second, cotton imports by Mexico increase well 
beyond the expiration of the safeguard agreements.  Third, China’s cotton T&A industry 
sustains losses in production, exports, and domestic consumption that continue past 
safeguard expiration as well.  These trends seem to indicate that the textile safeguards, at 
least in some markets, may serve to shift market share and competitive advantage away 
from China and back to a traditional textile exporter in close proximity to the U.S. which 
in this case is Mexico.  Additionally, our findings support the hypothesis that the benefits 
of free trade result in net global welfare gains.  This can be seen by the relatively large 
negative effect trade sanctions have in China compared to the smaller gains measured in 
the U.S.        - 11 -   
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Table 1. Major U.S. Textile Suppliers 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
MFA                       
China  10.65%  11.15%  9.77%  9.61%  9.10%  9.31%  12.11%  14.99%  17.47%  25.12%  12.93% 
CAFTA  11.83%  12.99%  12.72%  12.97%  12.64%  12.83%  12.69%  11.94%  11.50%  10.28%  12.24% 
Mexico  9.21%  10.98%  12.34%  13.52%  13.52%  12.74%  11.94%  10.25%  9.35%  8.12%  11.20% 
Pakistan  2.20%  2.22%  2.36%  2.31%  2.56%  2.74%  2.75%  2.86%  3.06%  3.26%  2.63% 
India  3.78%  3.72%  3.79%  3.74%  3.82%  3.75%  4.15%  4.15%  4.36%  5.18%  4.04% 
                       
Apparel                       
China  10.36%  10.48%  8.95%  8.60%  7.86%  8.15%  9.82%  11.87%  13.78%  22.04%  11.19% 
CAFTA  14.67%  16.14%  15.72%  16.05%  15.68%  15.82%  15.96%  15.01%  14.68%  13.25%  15.30% 
Mexico  9.78%  11.79%  13.48%  14.84%  14.70%  13.83%  13.03%  11.29%  10.32%  8.85%  12.19% 
Pakistan  1.54%  1.44%  1.40%  1.44%  1.61%  1.65%  1.54%  1.66%  1.76%  1.83%  1.59% 
India  3.26%  3.15%  3.15%  3.00%  3.12%  3.04%  3.34%  3.27%  3.42%  4.33%  3.31% 
                       
Cotton Apparel        
China  6.43%  6.61%  5.42%  5.01%  4.44%  4.61%  5.89%  6.63%  7.37%  14.59%  6.70% 
CAFTA  16.80%  18.85%  18.81%  19.42%  18.97%  18.74%  18.75%  18.12%  18.07%  15.78%  18.23% 
Mexico  10.79%  12.87%  15.08%  16.77%  16.91%  15.66%  14.54%  12.46%  11.74%  9.69%  13.65% 
Pakistan  2.67%  2.44%  2.35%  2.38%  2.58%  2.66%  2.41%  2.58%  2.78%  2.87%  2.57% 
India  4.45%  4.25%  4.09%  3.76%  3.81%  3.64%  4.05%  3.87%  4.31%  5.61%  4.18% 
                       
Man made fiber apparel     
China  13.64%  13.38%  11.46%  11.75%  10.65%  11.33%  12.90%  14.75%  16.41%  27.36%  14.36% 
CAFTA  13.22%  14.27%  13.50%  13.47%  13.22%  14.04%  14.08%  12.72%  12.53%  11.71%  13.28% 
Mexico  10.58%  12.66%  13.97%  14.79%  14.01%  13.55%  12.65%  11.26%  10.11%  9.02%  12.26% 
Pakistan  0.29%  0.38%  0.33%  0.29%  0.47%  0.45%  0.39%  0.42%  0.47%  0.37%  0.38% 
India  2.20%  2.04%  2.07%  2.01%  2.19%  2.13%  2.13%  2.23%  2.11%  2.34%  2.15% 
Data Source: Office of Textiles and Apparel.   - 14 -   
Table 2. Previous estimates of the effect of MFA phase-out on China’s textile industry  
Source  Assumptions  Method  Results 
Andriamananjara, 
et al., 2004 
U.S. MFA quotas on 
China equal a 20 
percent tariff 
Reduced form market 
share equation for 
United States’ imports 
Elasticity between quota 
tariff-equivalence and 




rises 20 to 30 percent 
with WTO accession 
PE, global: parameters 
estimated with 1981-
2000 data 
China’s cotton production 
rises 4-5 percent 
Francois and 
Spinanger, 2001 
U.S. MFA quotas on 
China  equal 33 to a 
percent tariff 
CGE, global, static: 
GTAP database (V.4) 
and model 
China’s textile production 
rises 6 percent (when a 10 
percent cost advantage 
for China’s industry is 
added, textile production 
rises 43 percent) 
Francois and 
Spinanger, 2004 







Reduced form market 
share equation for 
developed country 
imports 
U.S. MFA quotas on 
China equal to a 25 
percent tariff 
Hertel, et al 1996  U.S. MFA quotas on 
China equal to a 40 
percent tariff 
CGE, global, static: 
GTAP database (V.2) 
and model; elasticities 
of substitution doubled 
Textile output up 5.9 
percent 
Li. et al 2005   Remove MFA 
quotas 
PE   





coefficient in the 
export functions by 
0.3 percent 
annually 
CGE, global, dynamic: 
GTAP database 
version 6, pre-release 1 
Chinese textile exports 
increase 20 percent 
after 14 years and 33 
percent after 25 years 
Nordas, 2004  Quota rents shared 
between importing 
and exporting 
countries; U.S. MFA 
quotas equal to a 20 
percent tariff 
CGE, global, static: 
GTAP database (V.5) 
and model 
China’s share of U.S. 
clothing imports triples to 
50 percent; share of EU 
imports little changed at 
12 percent 
Rivera, et al, 2004  U.S. MFA quotas on 
China equal to a 33 
percent tariff 
CGE, global, static: 
GTAP database (V.5) 
and model 
China’s textile imports 
rise 18 percent, exports 8 
percent.  China’s clothing 
exports rise 104 percent 
Yang, 1997  U.S. MFA quotas 
equal to a 40 percent 
tariff 
CGE, global, static: 
GTAP database (V.2) 
and model 
China’s textile production 
rises 16 percent 
Sources: McDonald, et al. (2004).  - 15 -   
Table 3. Parameter estimates of the bivariate T&A trade equations between China and EU, US 
 







Chinese apparel exports 
to ROW  
-10383   -14.60*Chinese Apparel price index (API)/china CPI 
(237.52)  (5.74) 
+177.49141*Japan API +0.62787*lag(export to ROW ) 
  (18.11)                                (0.18) 
0.88  2.23  29.46 
EU textile imports from 
ROW 
18390   -14357*US API /US CPI+814.3618*Eu API/Eu CPI 
(37`0.79)    (3604.52)                          (233.01) 
0.79  1.60  7.98 
US textile and apparel 
imports from ROW 
-20985      +  252.23* US API /US CPI-86.99*CAFTA API/CAFTA  
(5308.82)      (53.17)                               (9.68) 
CPI+2936.93*Shift01 
        (412.04) 
0.89  1.59  43.21   - 16 -   
Table 4.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on Chinese, U.S., and E.U. Apparel Markets 
    2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
          Million Pounds         
                     
Chinese   Base  14472.49  16040.03  18510.54  20152.46  21729.95  23770.83  25904.91  27330.23  20988.93 
Exports  Safeguard  14231.83  15620.54  18031.88  19792.01  21515.61  23518.33  25589.90  27149.35  20681.18 
  Net Effect  -1.66%  -2.62%  -2.59%  -1.79%  -0.99%  -1.06%  -1.22%  -0.66%  -1.57% 
                     
Chinese   Base  65409.39  69501.69  77353.16  81982.12  86948.90  91928.87  97174.45  102693.91  84124.06 
Production  Safeguard  64872.36  68743.05  76548.87  81528.60  86525.57  91549.78  96836.67  102411.83  83627.09 
  Net Effect  -0.82%  -1.09%  -1.04%  -0.55%  -0.49%  -0.41%  -0.35%  -0.27%  -0.63% 
                     
Chinese Domestic   Base  50934.46  53461.16  58840.20  61833.01  65134.22  68159.54  71370.93  75360.20  63136.72 
Consumption  Safeguard  50644.98  53123.54  58520.24  61733.04  65010.92  68031.31  71250.92  75255.26  62946.28 
  Net Effect  -0.57%  -0.63%  -0.54%  -0.16%  -0.19%  -0.19%  -0.17%  -0.14%  -0.32% 
                     
U.S. Imports,   Base  15198.17  15404.84  15689.12  15718.16  15878.29  16011.20  16109.93  16091.41  15762.77 
China Excluded  Safeguard  15221.32  15459.78  15759.09  15777.18  15926.53  16051.62  16145.65  16120.41  15807.70 
  Net Effect  0.15%  0.35%  0.45%  0.38%  0.30%  0.25%  0.22%  0.18%  0.29% 
                     
E.U. Imports,    Base  6781.80  7007.88  7118.40  7478.44  7639.90  7718.47  7789.31  7796.95  7416.39 
China Excluded  Safeguard  6803.49  7027.91  7132.90  7481.49  7643.79  7722.40  7792.49  7800.13  7425.58 
   Net Effect  0.32%  0.29%  0.20%  0.04%  0.05%  0.05%  0.04%  0.04%  0.13% 
                     
Chinese Apparel   Base  91.18  95.45  96.61  98.39  98.66  98.33  98.64  97.81  96.88 
Price Index  Safeguard  92.37  96.74  97.73  98.71  99.06  98.72  98.99  98.10  97.55 
  Net Effect  1.31%  1.35%  1.16%  0.32%  0.40%  0.40%  0.36%  0.29%  0.70% 
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Table 5.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on the U.S. Cotton Textile Market 
    2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
                   
Textile Price   Base  73.80  89.93  95.56  91.40  92.12  93.31  96.54  97.50  91.23 
Index  Safeguard  76.46  92.35  97.59  91.78  92.72  93.88  97.01  97.89  92.46 
  Net Effect  3.60%  3.04%  2.12%  0.41%  0.65%  0.62%  0.49%  0.40%  1.42% 
          Million Pounds         
Net Imports  Base  8095.91  8319.71  8654.35  8803.14  9014.05  9236.59  9450.90  9568.79  8892.93 
  Safeguard  8086.31  8309.00  8645.78  8799.65  9011.36  9234.76  9449.02  9566.89  8887.85 
  Net Effect  -0.12%  -0.13%  -0.10%  -0.04%  -0.03%  -0.02%  -0.02%  -0.02%  -0.06% 
                     
Mill Use  Base  2865.69  2836.20  2819.62  2611.08  2529.97  2535.28  2446.15  2357.59  2625.20 
  Safeguard  2868.29  2839.64  2823.04  2613.19  2531.25  2536.30  2446.90  2358.30  2627.12 
  Net Effect  0.09%  0.12%  0.12%  0.08%  0.05%  0.04%  0.03%  0.03%  0.07% 
                     
Textile   Base  10961.67  11156.02  11473.26  11414.62  11543.14  11771.84  11896.26  11926.02  11517.85 
Consumption  Safeguard  10955.14  11149.36  11468.69  11413.48  11541.99  11770.67  11896.26  11926.02  11515.20 
   Net Effect  -0.06%  -0.06%  -0.04%  -0.01%  -0.01%  -0.01%  0.00%  0.00%  -0.02%   - 18 -   
Table 6.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on the U.S. Man-made Fiber Textile Market 
    2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
                   
Textile Price   Base  70.87  74.46  76.38  78.80  81.20  83.19  85.39  87.74  79.75 
Index  Safeguard  71.09  74.88  76.90  79.06  81.35  83.25  85.35  87.61  79.93 
  Net Effect  0.31%  0.56%  0.68%  0.32%  0.19%  0.06%  -0.05%  -0.14%  0.24% 
          Million Pounds         
Textile Net   Base  3522.46  3729.55  3874.30  3941.47  3997.67  4028.52  4060.82  4081.13  3904.49 
Imports  Safeguard  3510.17  3708.34  3849.81  3930.14  3990.76  4025.80  4063.95  4088.23  3895.90 
  Net Effect  2.83%  3.13%  3.78%  4.02%  3.94%  3.81%  3.73%  3.59%  3.60% 
                     
Mill Use  Base  8914.45  8288.62  8018.81  7840.57  7688.74  7641.84  7559.24  7476.44  7928.59 
  Safeguard  8917.14  8291.94  8020.41  7840.57  7689.51  7642.60  7558.48  7474.19  7929.36 
  Net Effect  0.30%  0.04%  0.02%  0.00%  0.01%  0.01%  -0.01%  -0.03%  0.01% 
                     
Textile   Base  12436.62  12018.28  11892.80  11781.80  11686.66  11670.46  11620.15  11557.76  11833.07 
Consumption  Safeguard  12427.97  12000.42  11870.49  11771.33  11679.73  11668.15  11622.44  11563.44  11825.50 
   Net Effect  -0.07%  -0.15%  -0.19%  -0.09%  -0.06%  -0.02%  0.02%  0.05%  -0.06% 
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Table 7.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on the World Cotton Market 
    2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
          Cents Per Pound         
A-index  Base  69.34  70.74  71.52  71.98  72.47  73.32  74.05  74.83  72.28 
  Safeguard  68.70  69.96  70.72  72.28  72.69  73.62  74.46  75.34  72.22 
  Net Effect  -0.91%  -1.12%  -1.11%  0.42%  0.30%  0.42%  0.55%  0.68%  -0.10% 
          Million Bales         
World Trade  Base  41.39  42.01  43.34  44.55  45.36  46.11  46.97  48.21  44.74 
  Safeguard  41.31  41.86  43.19  44.56  45.36  46.13  47.00  48.27  44.71 
  Net Effect  -0.21%  -0.35%  -0.35%  0.01%  0.01%  0.04%  0.07%  0.11%  -0.08% 
                     
World   Base  113.87  119.21  123.01  127.36  130.15  133.21  137.07  141.10  128.12 
Production  Safeguard  113.87  119.00  122.57  126.77  129.71  132.84  136.75  140.85  127.79 
  Net Effect  0.00%  -0.18%  -0.36%  -0.46%  -0.34%  -0.28%  -0.24%  -0.18%  -0.25% 
                     
World   Base  115.99  118.36  121.56  125.63  128.76  132.05  135.13  138.64  127.02 
Mill Use  Safeguard  115.91  118.19  121.28  125.34  128.44  131.73  134.83  138.37  126.76 
  Net Effect  -0.07%  -0.15%  -0.23%  -0.23%  -0.25%  -0.24%  -0.22%  -0.19%  -0.20%   - 20 -   
Table 8.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on the Cotton Markets of the U.S. and China 
    2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
U.S.          Cents per Pound         
Farm Price  Base  52.70  54.53  55.65  58.14  59.58  61.31  61.99  62.24  58.27 
  Safeguard  52.34  53.85  54.99  58.08  59.72  61.54  62.28  62.62  58.18 
  Net Effect  -0.66%  -1.24%  -1.19%  -0.10%  0.23%  0.37%  0.47%  0.60%  -0.19% 
          1000 Bales         
Production  Base  21914.60  21865.56  21942.24  22048.83  22048.09  22088.83  22162.71  22299.56  22046.30 
  Safeguard  21914.60  21861.23  21933.51  22040.05  22048.09  22088.83  22164.92  22304.01  22044.40 
  Net Effect  0.00%  -0.02%  -0.04%  -0.04%  0.00%  0.00%  0.01%  0.02%  -0.01% 
                     
Exports  Base  15993.19  16315.60  16831.43  17248.50  17281.06  17104.16  17341.79  17452.84  16946.07 
  Safeguard  15978.92  16294.75  16816.46  17251.91  17282.78  17105.86  17345.24  17456.31  16941.53 
  Net Effect  -0.09%  -0.13%  -0.09%  0.02%  0.01%  0.01%  0.02%  0.02%  -0.03% 
                     
China          Yuan per Pound         
Price  Base  7.31  7.25  7.61  6.97  7.70  8.14  8.37  8.21  7.69 
  Safeguard  7.19  7.09  7.48  6.96  7.71  8.17  8.42  8.27  7.66 
  Net Effect  -1.64%  -2.15%  -1.76%  -0.03%  0.11%  0.35%  0.61%  0.78%  -0.47% 
          1000 Bales         
Production  Base  27302.72  29103.03  300017.71  32175.75  33184.70  34355.55  36202.78  38137.94  32560.02 
  Safeguard  27302.72  29034.81  29878.76  31985.71  33025.14  34204.67  36058.52  38008.20  32437.32 
  Net Effect  0.00%  -0.23%  -0.46%  -0.59%  -0.48%  -0.44%  -0.40%  -0.34%  -0.37% 
                     
Imports  Base  16560.97  17500.06  19339.51  21632.70  23003.12  24132.68  25074.15  26480.22  21715.43 
  Safeguard  16549.46  17413.16  19183.47  21442.73  22849.75  23984.46  24933.36  26358.83  21589.40 
  Net Effect  -0.07%  -0.50%  -0.81%  -0.88%  -0.67%  -0.61%  -0.56%  -0.46%  -0.57% 
                     
Mill  Use  Base  43971.33  45427.58  47955.62  52080.51  54807.53  57221.57  59588.23  62506.91  52944.91 
  Safeguard  43932.09  45333.79  47797.03  51879.87  54572.55  56967.95  59332.37  62252.61  52758.53 
  Net Effect  -0.09%  -0.21%  -0.33%  -0.39%  -0.43%  -0.44%  -0.43%  -0.41%  -0.34% 
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Table 9.  Safeguard Agreement Effects on Major Cotton Exporters and Importers 
      2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14  Average 
Exporters          1000 Bales         
Australia  Base  2966.60  3020.37  2978.35  3017.25  3088.21  3196.12  3358.19  3573.82  3149.86 
  Safeguard  2959.37  3006.59  2974.33  3019.88  3089.40  3198.94  3362.14  3574.87  3148.19 
  Net Effect  -0.24%  -0.46%  -0.14%  0.09%  0.04%  0.09%  0.12%  0.03%  -0.06% 
                     
Brazil  Base  2196.50  2912.32  3125.58  3362.28  3724.71  3916.18  4048.90  4243.64  3441.26 
  Safeguard  2194.37  2911.48  3124.07  3363.91  3725.79  3916.94  4049.68  4244.47  3441.34 
  Net Effect  -0.10%  -0.03%  -0.05%  0.05%  0.03%  0.02%  0.02%  0.02%  0.00% 
                     
Uzbekistan  Base  4564.95  4600.23  4615.12  4697.11  4718.62  4702.85  4692.29  4724.75  4664.49 
   Safeguard  4562.70  4596.63  4316.31  4699.40  4736.70  4726.52  4720.16  4755.73  4676.39 
   Net Effect  -0.05%  -0.08%  -0.04%  0.05%  0.38%  0.50%  0.59%  0.66%  0.25% 
                     
Western Africa  Base  3674.51  3818.46  3962.24  4094.19  4167.24  4236.41  4311.41  4369.57  4079.25 
  Safeguard  3672.33  3818.08  3957.95  4095.39  4168.47  4239.32  4319.49  4376.93  4080.99 
  Net Effect  -0.06%  -0.01%  -0.11%  0.03%  0.03%  0.07%  0.19%  0.17%  0.04% 
                     
Importers                     
Turkey  Base  3545.66  3498.57  3469.04  3462.67  3467.61  3438.26  3414.41  3369.96  3458.27 
  Safeguard  3542.85  3489.65  3454.57  3449.33  3459.61  3435.61  3415.73  3374.52  3452.73 
  Net Effect  -0.08%  -0.25%  -0.42%  -0.39%  -0.23%  -0.08%  0.04%  0.14%  -0.16% 
                     
Pakistan  Base  1564.53  1613.89  1650.93  1695.72  1814.21  1968.84  2148.73  2149.58  1825.80 
  Safeguard  1555.61  1602.50  1642.63  1704.82  1822.41  1975.23  2154.65  2155.50  1826.67 
  Net Effect  -0.57%  -0.71%  -0.50%  0.54%  0.45%  0.32%  0.28%  0.28%  0.01% 
                     
Mexico  Base  1604.56  1564.17  1492.27  1446.23  1371.22  1331.52  1310.58  1310.58  1428.89 
  Safeguard  1605.37  1565.59  1494.54  1448.73  1374.16  1333.70  1311.92  1311.11  1430.64 
   Net Effect  0.05%  0.09%  0.15%  0.17%  0.21%  0.16%  0.10%  0.04%  0.12% 
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Table 10. Average Economic Gains and Losses Due to the Safeguard Agreement 
         2006/07-2008/09  2009/10-2013/14  2006/07-2013/14 
U.S.        Million $US     
Producer  Cotton  Base  869.85    771.85    808.60 
     Safeguard  743.88    814.51    788.02 
    Difference  -125.96    42.66    -20.58 
               
  T&A  Base  -1706.71    -1177.85    -1376.17 
     Safeguard  -1058.25    -1077.97    -1070.57 
    Difference  648.46    99.88    305.60 
               
Consumer    Base  5289.37    5065.41    5149.39 
    Safeguard  5289.00    5065.34    5149.21 
    Difference  -0.37    -0.07    -0.18 
               
Government  Safeguard  Base  -888.29    -  888.29    -793.40 
Expenditure    Safeguard  -748.96    -823.39    -795.48 
    Difference  139.33    -29.99    33.50 
               
China               
Producer  Cotton  Base  2119.23    2956.98    2642.82 
     Safeguard  1844.37    2949.31    2534.96 
    Difference  -274.85    -7.67    -107.86 
               
  T&A  Base  1851.62    6509.27    4762.65 
    Safeguard  1271.29    6667.55    4643.95 
    Difference  -580.32    158.28    -118.70 
               
Consumer    Base  8021.21    15652.06    12790.49 
    Safeguard  6891.39    15242.22    12110.66 
      Difference  -1129.82    -409.84    -679.84   - 23 -   
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Figure 2. China’s Share of the Domestic Textile and Apparel Import Market  
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Figure 3.  Linkage between CGE model and PE model 